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Summary  
Contact tracing, quarantine and isolation are core communicable disease control measures used by 
public health departments as part of a comprehensive case ascertainment and management strategy. 
These are practices with historic roots enabled by state laws and policies, and have been used by 
other countries to slow and stop the spread of COVID-19. To date, their implementation as part of 
U.S. response efforts at the national, state, and local levels has been confounded by the scale of the 
COVID-19 outbreak; lack of a systemic infectious disease response; insufficient and fragmented 
funding streams; low levels of public accountability; and concerns about the impact of such efforts 
on individual privacy, liberty, and travel rights, as well as the financial and personal costs that may 
arise out of a positive diagnosis. Recommendations have been offered by expert groups on both the 
scaling up of contact tracing and ensuring ethical implementation of such measures. One state has 
passed legislation establishing an oversight framework for state contact tracing and associated data 
collection and use. Legal challenges to interstate quarantine rules have, thus far, been unsuccessful. 
Recommendations include: appropriating federal funding adequate to mount and sustain rapid, 
comprehensive, culturally-appropriate state and local testing, treatment, contact tracing, and 
supported quarantine and isolation service efforts; building contact tracing systems that cover social 
as well as health care supports for those affected; and, to bolster trust and participation in public 
health efforts, implement contact tracing-related health communication efforts targeted to reach the 
diverse array of communities affected by the epidemic.  
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Introduction 
Testing, contact tracing, quarantine of those deemed to have come in close contact with infected 
people, and isolation of those who test positive, comprise a systemic response to slow the 
transmission of an infectious disease like COVID-19, for which there are neither effective, widely-
available treatments nor a vaccine. The history of effective use of state and local contact tracing and 
quarantine and isolation measures to address infectious disease outbreaks date back to before the 
establishment of the United States. While grounded in fundamental police power authority, such 
efforts are subject to judicial scrutiny, as they infringe upon fundamental, constitutionally-protected 
rights including privacy, freedom of travel, equal protection, and due process. These measures have 
been used in past, more-limited infectious disease outbreaks with some success; however, the nature 
and spread of COVID-19, and the costs of creating, implementing, and sustaining a disease control 
and social support infrastructure that is effective, just, and grounded in equity are daunting. 
 
Contact Tracing 
Case investigation and contact tracing are “fundamental activities that involve working with a patient 
(symptomatic and asymptomatic) who has been diagnosed with an infectious disease to identify and 
provide support to people (contacts) who may have been infected through exposure to the patient.” 
(CDC, 2020) This process has been used successfully in numerous infection control programs, 
including tuberculosis, HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, measles, SARS, and Ebola. 
This type of “shoe-leather epidemiology” by “disease detectives” is key to surveillance efforts aimed 
at understanding the spread of the infectious disease. The authority to conduct such contact tracing 
efforts is rooted in the state’s core public health power to prevent and respond to infectious disease 
outbreaks.  
 
Contact tracing helps slow the spread of an infectious disease in a community through the following 
process:  
a. A trained member of a contact tracing program (“contact tracer”) gets in touch with 
individuals newly diagnosed with a SARS-CoV-2 infection and/or COVID-19, educates them 
Final version published at:  
Silverman, R. D. (2020). Chapter 3. Contact Tracing, Intrastate and Interstate Quarantine, and Isolation. 
In S. Burris, S. de Gula, L. Gable, D. E. Levin, W. E. Parmet, & N. Terry (Eds.), Assessing Legal 
Responses to COVID-19. Public Health Law Watch. 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5956e16e6b8f5b8c45f1c216/t/5f36c0702e9042616f135
05c/1597423914220/COVID19PolicyPlaybook_Aug2020.pdf 
 
about the disease, and requests that they stop interacting with others during their period of 
infectiousness;  
b. Through interviewing the infected person, the contact tracer seeks to identify recent 
circumstances where the infected person likely came in close contact with others and 
potentially exposed those people to infection; 
c. The contact tracer then communicates with these “close contacts,” informs them that they 
likely have been exposed to the infection, encourages them to seek out testing and to stop 
interacting with others until either they receive test results indicating they are not infected, or 
until the period of infectiousness has ended. Current CDC recommendations for most cases 
with mild to moderate COVID-19 symptoms are to maintain isolation and precautions until  
10 days after symptom onset and 24 hours after fever has subsided without the aid of 
medications. 
 
In addition, contact tracers work to connect those they contact with health care, social services and 
other resources that may help the contacted person to overcome obstacles to testing, treatment, and 
completion of their period of quarantine or isolation.  
 
Contact tracing is a labor- and time-intensive process demanding both technical training and 
interpersonal skill. Like most public health interventions, agencies conducting contact tracing 
generally seek voluntary participation from those with new diagnoses and close contacts (“self-
quarantine”), as such an approach represents the “least intrusive” means to gather personal 
information and maintains trust in the public health effort. As with other surveillance-related 
information gathered by public health departments, the identity of the person with the positive 
diagnosis is protected as confidential, as is information gathered during the contact tracing process.  
 
 
When case counts in a particular geographic area are low, contact tracing efforts can help suppress 
the spread of the disease. Contact tracing also serves as a part of mitigation strategies. By identifying 
contacts of those identified as carrying the virus, and helping those identified contacts to get tested 
and to quarantine, the contact tracing process can help reduce community transmission and spread, 
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keeping symptomatic case counts down to a level within local health care capacity. Furthermore, 
such efforts do not need perfect execution (identifying every symptomatic patient and every contact 
of every patient) to have a significant impact. Nor should contact tracing be abandoned during times 
of widespread virus transmission. Under such circumstances, contact tracing can be highly effective 
if such efforts are focused on “cluster breaking,” identifying circumstances where virus transmission 
occurred en masse, such as in large gatherings, nursing homes, processing plants, dormitories, cruise 
ships, and jails and prisons.   
 
 
The effectiveness and efficiency of contact tracing will be affected by the characteristics of the 
infection, the availability of timely testing, as well as the contact tracing agency’s capacity to handle 
the area case volume. Each positive diagnosis may result in numerous close contacts that may then 
require rapid follow up. (CDC, 2020) Because SARS-CoV-2 spreads easily and asymptomatically, 
COVID-19-related contact tracing must occur extremely rapidly, or risk becoming ineffective. This 
presents significant implementation challenges for most state and local health departments, which 
have suffered devastating budget and personnel cuts over the past 15 years, including the elimination 
of 50,000 public health positions in the 2008 recession alone. (Watson et al., 2020) The Johns 
Hopkins Center for Health Security estimates that an effective response to the national spread of 
COVID-19 will require adding approximately 100,000 contact tracers to the existing public health 
workforce. (Watson et al., 2020) Because of the lack of effective treatments and vaccines, if contact 
tracing efforts are ineffective or overwhelmed, communities nationwide risk nearly unchecked spread 
of COVID-19, and disease control will require the implementation of broader, more blunt public 
health measures, such as the introduction of community stay-at-home measures and business and 
school closures. 
 
Contact tracing is more than a surveillance and infectious disease control mechanism. The scale up of 
the contract tracing workforce can result in the hiring of many workers who may have lost other 
means of support during the pandemic. When contact tracing programs are rooted in values such as 
human rights and dignity, due process, and community engagement, those hired as contact tracers 
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will be drawn from, reflect the cultures within, and speak the languages of, the local communities 
they will serve. 
 
To build public health literacy and trust in the public health response efforts, when implementing 
contact tracing initiatives, public officials and public health agencies should supplement the front-
line disease management efforts with targeted public education campaigns about the processes that 
will be used in local contact tracing efforts, the need for public cooperation with such efforts, and 
how this collaboration will aid Covid-19 response.   
 
As the CDC notes, contact tracing also is “part of the process of supporting patients with suspected 
or confirmed infection.” Such efforts, ideally, will provide those with new diagnoses and their close 
contacts with information about available local social and health services, facilitating rapid access to 
care and easing burdens related to quarantine and isolation. This may include basics, such as food, 
laundry, housing assistance (or hotel-based services for those without stable housing); childcare or 
dependent care services; connection with health insurance and/or treatment services; and  income 
supports, ways to get protected time off, or unemployment assistance. (CDC, 2020) Tracing efforts 
also should include follow up and check in with cases and contacts periodically during their time in 
self-quarantine, assessing how well the contact is coping, and reminding the service recipients to 
continue to self-monitor while staying at home. These steps not only advance justice, equity, and 
health literacy, but will also help build and maintain public trust in public health efforts, improve 
adherence with public health directives, and ensure that social and health services are provided in a 
community- and culturally-appropriate manner. 
 
Legal Issues with Contact Tracing Implementation by State and Local Health Departments 
There are few legal barriers to local implementation of COVID-19 contact tracing efforts. State 
legislatures long ago delegated to public health agencies the authority and responsibility for 
infectious disease surveillance, investigation, and control. Furthermore, contact tracing is viewed by 
the public health community as a sound public health practice. Finally, state emergency powers laws 
have given state executives and their associated agencies broader authority to purchase resources and 
services to respond to the epidemic. 
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Both implementation and legal issues have arisen related to contact tracing during the COVID-19 
epidemic. The nation’s slow response and lack of testing meant that COVID-19 rapidly became 
widespread. This led state and local health departments to redeploy their scant supply of extant 
contact tracers from other surveillance duties to COVID-19-related efforts. That capacity was then 
overwhelmed, leading the federal government, state, and local health departments to begin hiring, 
training, and deploying additional contact tracers, or contracting with outside companies and 
agencies to provide area contact tracing services.  
 
Many states and communities also have chosen to rely on engaging with close contacts via telephone 
call centers, rather than through face-to-face interviews. While this may reduce outreach-related time 
and travel costs, and increase the safety of contact tracers, such an approach could adversely affect 
public trust and participation in contact tracing efforts, as contact tracers will be more anonymous 
(and may be mistaken for telemarketers). Best practice standards recommend that, to maximize trust, 
those hired as contact tracers come from the communities they will serve. This may not always occur 
with tracing operations that are centralized (as opposed to run by the local public health department) 
or that use a national pool of employees.. Furthermore, the size and scale of the outbreak have led to 
recommendations that human contact tracing efforts be supplemented with digital contact tracing 
applications. 
 
The lack of adequate federal funding to support a massive scale up in contact tracing capacity means 
that most jurisdictions struggle to use contact tracing as a means to suppress the outbreak. 
Furthermore, at this time, few jurisdictions share information publicly about the effectiveness of their 
contact tracing efforts, raising questions of accountability and, for those contracting with external 
vendors, the transparency of the use of public funds. 
 
Both the use of contractors to conduct contact tracing efforts and potential digital contact tracing 
applications have raised significant privacy and data use questions [see chapter 6]. In June 2020, 
Kansas passed the COVID-19 Contact Tracing Privacy Act during an emergency session of the 
legislature. (Kansas Legislature, 2020) Several provisions make explicit best practices for contact 
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tracing, including establishing expectations for hiring qualified contact tracers, as well as privacy 
protections over information collected and handled during the contact tracing process. Other 
provisions significantly favor individual privacy over benefits the use of that private information 
might offer to public health efforts. The law prohibits the use of cellphone location data for contact 
tracing purposes. It also establishes that third parties may not “be required to collect or maintain data 
regarding infected persons or contacts for the purpose of contact tracing,” thereby prohibiting public 
health agencies from requiring that places such as businesses and schools track the COVID-19 status 
of their employees or students, respectively. (Kansas Legislature, 2020) Finally, the law also 
establishes that participation in contact tracing is voluntary, and that neither contacts nor those with 
new diagnoses may be compelled to participate in the contact tracing process. It is unclear whether 
these provisions will foster greater public trust and participation in contact tracing efforts or reduce 
any stigma that may be associated with a positive COVID-19 diagnosis. Alternatively, it is also 
unclear whether, by raising these as concerns, the Kansas law may foment increased skepticism and 
reluctance to collaborate with public health. 
  
Most public health experts and ethical guidance recommend that participation in contact tracing 
efforts remain voluntary. (CDC, 2020) However, in June 2020, officials in Rockland County, NY, in 
an effort to compel the participation in contact tracing efforts of several people suspected of having 
come in contact with the virus during gatherings held in violation of local social distancing rules, 
issued subpoenas against eight people believed to have attended one of the gatherings, threatening 
the individuals with $2000/day fines for noncompliance. (Shanahan, 2020) While the measure 
succeeded in garnering contact participation, establishing such an approach as a widespread policy is 
not recommended, as it not only raises significant implementation questions, including concerns 
about inequitable application, but it also risks public trust in and acceptance of current and future 
infectious disease control efforts. 
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Quarantine and Isolation 
When medical treatment and prevention measures are inadequate or unavailable, public health efforts 
may need to more heavily rely upon older forms of public health intervention to stem the spread of 
dangerous infectious diseases. Quarantine is the restriction of movement of an individual suspected 
of having been exposed to an infectious disease. Isolation is the restriction of movement of an 
individual who has a confirmed case of an infectious disease. (Other restrictions on mass movement 
such as stay-at-home orders, are addressed in Chapter 5.) The history of laws and cases supporting 
the state and community exercise of what came to be known as their “police power authority” to 
protect the public from communicable diseases via quarantine and isolation trace back to the earliest 
days of the United States (Parmet, 2020). As stated by Justice Harlan in the 1905 Supreme Court case 
of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court “has distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact 
quarantine laws.” (Jacobson, 1905) 
 
However, this power is neither unbounded nor exempt from judicial review, even in times of 
emergency. The use of these response strategies continue to “raise vital social, political and 
constitutional questions because they interfere with basic human freedoms: association, travel, and 
liberty.” (Gostin & Wiley, 2016) 
 
As noted in the Contact Tracing section above, ethical best practices for public health recommend 
that the “least restrictive” approach be used to bring about the desired public health outcome. 
Quarantine and isolation are meant, first and foremost, as preventive, not punitive measures. (Gostin 
& Wiley, 2016) The state or community should be prepared to demonstrate that quarantine and/or 
isolation is necessary, and not merely “erring on the side of caution” or a tactic to assuage public 
fear. Ethical quarantine and isolation practices also means:  
• Use of such measures should be based on the best available science concerning the risk and 
communicability of the disease; 
• Science should also inform the targeting of the intervention, as well as the effectiveness of 
the proposed control measure;  
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• Whenever possible, voluntary self-quarantine and home-based efforts should be pursued and 
determined to have failed to achieve the public health goal prior to enacting compulsory 
measures; 
• Such interventions should be as narrowly applied as possible and implemented with 
consideration for due process rights; 
• These measures should be conducted safely and humanely; and 
• Ideally, those who must be quarantined and isolated will be supported during their period of 
restriction, not only with basic needs such as health care, food, and sanitary conditions 
(Parmet & Sinha, 2020), but also housing (if homeless), eviction protection, other social 
resources, and employment protection. (Harvard, 2020) 
  
Isolation and quarantine decisions are generally reviewable in court, under a writ of habeas corpus. 
While courts often defer to state disease control decisions, courts have overturned quarantine 
measures for being ineffective under the circumstances, improperly implemented under a local 
emergency powers ordinance, and/or motivated by discriminatory intent (Parmet & Sinha, 2020).  
 
Novel legal questions have not been raised about health departments applying “traditional” 
quarantine and/or isolation measures to individuals during the COVID-19 epidemic (e.g., contacts 
discovered through tracing efforts or newly diagnosed cases). In fact, the scale of the COVID-19 
epidemic, coupled with public health workforce shortages, has made challenging, if not unfeasible, 
the close monitoring of those advised to quarantine. 
 
One type of quarantine – travelers’ quarantine – has been the focus of significant legislative activity, 
commentator scrutiny, and judicial review during the COVID-19 epidemic. From early March until 
early July, 2020, at least 28 states, the city of Chicago, and Puerto Rico have passed rules imposing 
quarantine on travelers into their jurisdictions from other places where disease is more widespread 
(Tolbert et al., 2020). Judicial review of challenges to the structure and enforcement of state laws 
imposing traveler quarantines has occurred in at least two federal district courts.   
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From a public health perspective, interstate traveler quarantines are, at best, a blunt instrument for 
controlling the spread of COVID-19, especially in light of the lack of effective, timely, widespread 
testing, the amount of asymptomatic and low-symptom transmission, and the logistics of tracking 
interstate travel. If anything, such rules may be as much a health communication strategy to 
encourage out of state people to stay home as a measure to control local disease transmission.  
 
However, in actions brought before federal district courts in Maine and Hawai’i, judges declined to 
disturb state rules requiring 14-day quarantines for visitors and local residents traveling into their 
jurisdiction from out of state. (Bayley’s Campground, 2020; Carmichael, 2020) In Bayley’s 
Campground, the judge acknowledged the freedom to travel’s roots in several core constitutional 
sources, including the Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection 
Clauses, and felt the quarantine measure should be subject to strict scrutiny, rather than the Jacobson 
case’s more contextual “rule of reasonableness” (see Parmet, 2020). Nevertheless, the judge found 
the state had a compelling interest in protecting the public from many infectious people coming into 
the state and potentially overwhelming their local health system capacity, and that current limits on 
testing, and our limited knowledge of COVID-19 virus immunity, meant there were no more feasible, 
less restrictive approaches the government could take under the circumstances. (Bayley’s 
Campground, 2020) 
 
In Carmichael, instead of selecting either the Jacobson-style review or the more modern strict 
scrutiny review to assess Hawai’i’s rule requiring visitors and returning residents undergo 14-day 
quarantines upon return, the judge ran the case through both approaches, and found that the state’s 
rationale and approach would pass muster under either standard.  
 
Absent building strong, equitable, trustworthy, and reliable local testing and communicable disease 
case ascertainment and management systems across the United States, the country risks devastating, 
uncontrolled COVID-19-fueled morbidity, mortality, and economic disruptions until safe, effective, 
and widely-accessible treatments and vaccines become available. With improvement of our testing 
and tracing capacity and understanding of COVID-19, it will be more feasible for states and 
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communities to implement more targeted control measures. At that time, courts scrutinizing state 
actions would be justified in raising its expectations for narrower, individually-tailored, rather than 
population-focused, interventions. 
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Recommendations for Action 
Federal 
• Congress should appropriate significant, expanded, ongoing funding (until the abatement of 
the epidemic or widespread uptake of a safe, effective COVID-19 vaccine) for state and local 
testing and contact tracing efforts; appropriations should require the employment of a 
culturally-sensitive, linguistically-competent workforce reflecting the make-up of the 
community.  
• Congress should strengthen, extend for a longer period of time, and minimize employer 
exemptions from the protected time-off benefits available under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act and Families First Coronavirus Response Act to facilitate the needs of employees 
who are quarantined or isolated due to COVID-19 or have caregiver duties for those who 
have been quarantined/isolated; 
 
State  
• State legislatures should fund, and state health departments should implement and/or contract 
for robust, ongoing contact tracing systems that are closely connected to the communities 
they serve, including employment of a culturally-diverse and -sensitive workforce;  
• State health departments should implement and/or contract for contact tracing services that, 
whenever possible, engage existing community-based organizations to facilitate connection 
with diverse local communities and service needs; 
• State health departments, in their implementation of contact tracing training and programs, 
should seek to identify and address unique barriers and concerns that may arise with outreach 
and service provision efforts to immigrant and migrant populations, including issues 
associated with immigration and public charge rules; 
• State legislatures should fund, and state health and social services agencies should implement 
systems that ensure those testing positive and identified as close contacts have access to 
health care, mental health, social services, and employment and housing protections needed 
for effective SARS-CoV-2 treatment and quarantine;  
• Governors and/or executive branch agencies overseeing state-led contact tracing programs 
should regularly report data to the public related to their contact tracing outreach and case 
ascertainment efforts; if necessary, legislatures should mandate these data disclosures; 
• Governors, through Executive Orders, and/or legislatures, through amending extant housing, 
utilities, and employment laws, should extend protections against eviction, mortgage 
foreclosure, utility shut off, discrimination, and employment loss due to quarantine and/or 
isolation;  
• State health departments should develop and implement expanded, multi-lingual health 
communication efforts to boost public trust and participation in, and awareness of, contact 
tracing initiatives. 
 
Local 
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• Local government should fund, and local health departments should implement, ongoing 
contact tracing systems that are closely connected to the communities they serve, including 
employment of a culturally-diverse and -sensitive workforce;  
• Local health departments should implement and/or contract for contact tracing services that, 
whenever possible, engage existing community-based organizations to facilitate connection 
with diverse local communities and service needs; 
• Local health departments, in their implementation of contact tracing training and programs, 
should seek to identify and address unique barriers and concerns that may arise with outreach 
and service provision efforts to local immigrant and migrant populations, including issues 
associated with immigration and public charge rules; 
• Local health departments overseeing state-led contact tracing programs should regularly 
report data related to their contact tracing outreach and case ascertainment efforts;  
• Local government, through Emergency Orders and/or amending extant housing, utilities, and 
employment ordinances, should extend protections against eviction, mortgage foreclosure, 
and utility shut off connected with quarantine and/or isolation; 
• Local government and health departments should develop and implement expanded, multi-
lingual health communication efforts to boost public trust and participation in, and awareness 
of, contact tracing initiatives. 
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